法律翻译 | 《哥大商法评论》第2017卷第2期目录+摘要

Controlling Controlling-Minority Shareholders 

Corporate Governance and 

Leveraged Corporate Control

控制少数控股股东

公司治理与杠杆公司控制

作者：Yu-Hsin Lin

The “one-share one-vote principle,” which states that a shareholder’s voting power is proportionate to his or her economic right, is one of the most fundamental rules in modern corporate law. However, in reality, controlling shareholders often obtain voting rights in excess of their economic rights through control-enhancing mechanisms, allowing them to leverage control over the firm. Empirical studies indicate that leveraged corporate control is prevalent among listed companies of various countries, yet, to date, many countries still disagree on a regulatory framework. The EU and OECD conducted studies concerning the regulatory policy over control-enhancing mechanisms several years ago. However, failing to reach a consensus, the reports only advised governments to enhance disclosure and transparency. In recent years, entrepreneurs hoping to maintain their control after public listing have sought to utilize dual-class share structures to leverage corporate control when going public. This led to recent reviews by the Hong Kong and Singapore stock exchanges—the Hong Kong Stock Exchange refused to grant listing with dual-class share structure, while the Singapore Stock Exchange approved the proposal to allow listing companies to have dual-class shares in order to maintain competitiveness. This recent development further exemplifies the complexities involved in regulating leveraged corporate control and the need to address relevant corporate governance concerns.

“一股一权”原则，表明了股东的投票权与其经济权利是相适应的，这是现代公司法最基本的规则。但事实上，控股股东经常通过控制权强化机制获得超过他们经济权利的投票权，从而实现对公司杠杆股权的控制。实证研究显示，杠杆控制公司在很多国家的上市公司普遍存在，但是截止日前，许多国家仍在监管框架上存在分歧。欧盟和经济合作与发展组织在几年前就控制权强化机制的监管政策开展了研究。然而，由于未能达成共识，这些报告仅建议各国政府加强披露以及透明度。近年来，企业主希望在企业公开上市后仍有公司控制权，他们已经试图利用双层股权结构在公司上市时杠杆控制公司。这导致了香港和新加坡证券交易所最近的审查——香港证券交易所拒绝带有双层股权结构的上市，而新加坡证券交易所为了保持竞争力，批准了上市公司拥有双层股权架构的提案。最近的发展进一步例证了杠杆公司控制监管中的复杂性以及处理公司治理相关问题的必要性。

This Article reviews the inadequacy of past theoretical and empirical research on leveraged corporate control, and re-examines the issue of corporate governance from the contractarian view of corporate law. The Article differentiates between the IPO and post-IPO (or midstream) stages and argues that the contracting mechanism does not work well in the midstream stage. Controlling-minority shareholders usually set out various pro-insider provisions in IPO charters, which deters minority shareholders from repealing inefficient provisions or adopting other value-increasing provisions in the midstream. Furthermore, through an analysis Google and Facebook’s midstream issuance of non-voting Class C shares and the recent going-private transactions of U.S.-listed Chinese firms, this Article illustrates the opportunistic behaviors of leveraged corporate controllers through midstream charter amendments. Finally, this Article discusses potential governance strategies against pro-insider midstream distortions. Adhering to the “one-share one-vote” principle and prohibiting dual-class share structure would hinder the flexibility of corporate financing and affect economic development. This Article therefore argues against outright prohibition of control-enhancing mechanisms and advocates returning the governance decision to the hands of shareholders by empowering shareholders. In particular, the participation of institutional investors and shareholder activists is essential to counteract the superpower of controlling-minority shareholders and to govern their midstream opportunistic behaviors.

本文回顾了过去杠杆公司控制理论与实证研究的不足，并从公司法的契约论观点重新检视了公司治理。本文区分了首次公开发行（IPO）和首次公开发行后（或者正在首次公开发行中）阶段，并提出契约机制在发行中的制度效果并不理想。少数控股股东常常在IPO条款中设置各种内幕便利条款，以阻止中小股东废除无效条款或在发行中适用其他增值条款。而且，本文通过分析谷歌和脸书无投票权的C类股票的发行中游阶段以及最近在美国上市中国公司的私有化交易，展示了杠杆公司控制者们通过中游条款修订方式的投机行为。最后，本文讨论了对内幕控制中游扭曲的潜在规制策略。坚持“一股一权”原则、禁止双层股权结构会限制企业融资的弹性、影响经济发展。因此本文反对绝对禁止加强控制机制，并提倡通过股东赋权的方式将治理决策权交还到股东手上。特别是机构投资者及股权活动家对于对抗少数控股股东并控制他们中段投机行为非常关键。

原文链接：

https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/article/view/1719

（图片来源于网络）

Putting Directors’ Money 

Where Their Mouths Are

A New Approach to Improving Corporate Takeover Dynamics

把董事的钱递到他们嘴边

提升公司收购动态的新路径

作者：Nitzan Shilon

This paper aims to improve shareholder protection from underpriced bids in takeover situations. Target boards, as stewards of the corporation who typically possess superior information about the desirability of unsolicited bids, can be expected to protect their shareholders from such bids. Unfortunately, because they have a conflict of interest with their shareholders in takeover situations, they tend to reject hostile bids to an excessive degree. Moreover, the current Delaware doctrine is ineffective in monitoring boards’ responses to takeovers, largely because boards might use selective inside information to which the courts lack access and because their judgments are backed by subjective, hard-to-attack legal and financial expert opinions which courts are ill-equipped to challenge. To rectify the problems of courts’ and shareholders’ inferior information as well as boards’ skewed incentives, I propose an arrangement in which target boards wishing to veto nonstructurally coercive takeover bids would be encouraged to demonstrate their opposition by committing to buy, if the bid fails, and hold for a specified period of time a certain amount of target stock at the bid price. The directors would be incentivized to follow the arrangement because it would require courts, in a potential fiduciary duties lawsuit, to give directors’ commitments significant weight when evaluating their defense that they rejected the bid to protect their shareholders.

本文旨在收购过程中加强股东保护，免于价格过低的投标。目标董事会作为公司的管理者，对于主动报价的可取性显然具有更多的信息。在这种报价中，他们应该可以保护公司股东。不幸的是在收购形势下，由于董事会的利益诉求与股东存在冲突，他们倾向于过度强硬地拒绝敌意收购。而且，最近的特拉华原则在监督董事会对于收购者的回应方面显得无效，主要是因为董事会可能会选择性地利用法院难以获得的内部信息，且他们的判断由主观、难以攻克的法律和金融专家的意见背书，法院难以进行挑战。为了纠正法院和股东的信息劣势以及董事会倾斜的激励机制这一系列的问题，本文提出一种安排，即如果目标董事会希望否决强制收购要约，可以通过承诺购买来展示他们的反对。如果要约失效，就需要以买入价在特定时间段内持有一定数量的目标股票。董事们将被鼓励遵循这一安排，因为在潜在的信托责任诉讼中，这将要求法院在评估董事以保护股东作为拒绝要约的辩护时，更加重视他们作出的承诺。

Adopting the proposed arrangement can significantly address important problems in corporate takeovers that have long claimed the attention of corporate law scholars and financial economists. In particular, inducing target boards to credibly transmit their genuine bottom-line understanding about the desirability of a bid would offset the courts’ inability to review the directors’ decision effectively. Imposing personal costs that the directors would uniquely incur if they wish to reject hostile bids would counteract the directors’ ex-post incentive to reject hostile bids excessively. Increasing the directors’ cost of a takeover attempt would improve market discipline and motivate the directors to increase firm value and reduce agency costs. Finally, favoring firms with high long-term value would protect them from myopic bidders and alleviate their unrelenting pressure to meet quarterly earnings expectations. For these reasons, the proposed arrangement could greatly improve corporate takeover dynamics.

采用这种安排可以显著地解决在公司收购中的重要问题，这些问题一直为法学学者和金融经济学家关注。特别是引导目标董事去可信地传达他们对于要约可取性的真实底线理解，将会有效地抵消法院无法审查董事会决定的情况。董事想要拒绝恶意收购时，上述安排将为董事施加个人成本，这会抵消董事们过度地否决恶意收购的事后激励。增加董事收购意图中的成本将会提高市场的纪律，激励董事增加公司价值并减少代理成本。最后，为公司赋予长远价值可以规避短期投标人、减轻其为满足季度盈利预期而不断承受的压力。基于以上这些原因，拟定的安排将会有效地提高公司收购动态。

原文链接：

https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/article/view/1720

（图片来源于网络）

To Thine Own CEO Be True

Tailoring CEO Compensation to Individual Personality and Circumstances

忠实于自己的执行总裁

根据个人性格与情况调整执行总裁的薪酬

作者：William O. Fisher

Eight-figure compensation. Cash. Restricted stock. Options. Performance shares. And more. Companies shower their CEOs with pay in large amounts, delivered in multiple ways, and dependent on complex and intricate formulae. It is all intended to motivate the top officers to make decisions that will best benefit their companies. Common sense tells us that the value of a complicated, multifaceted pay package—and hence its ability to motivate—will depend on the psychological characteristics and financial circumstances of the particular executive being paid. Economic theory and empirical studies confirm this intuition. Yet, companies generally ignore these vital factors. Substantive and disclosure law should push them to take these key variables into account.

八位数的赔偿、现金、限制性股票、期权、绩效股……公司以多种方式向他们的执行总裁提供高额薪资，且依赖于复杂且隐秘的公式。这都是为了激励这些高层的管理人员作出对于公司最有利的决策。常识告诉我们，一个复杂且多方面的薪酬方案的价值——以及其激励能力——均取决于接受薪酬的特定高管的心理特征与其财务状况。经济理论与实证研究都验证了这一直觉。但是公司常常忽略了这些关键因素。实体法和披露法应当督促他们把这些重要的变量纳入考量。

原文链接：

https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/article/view/1721

（图片来源于网络）

National Anti-Vulture Funds Legislation

Belgium's Turn

国家反秃鹰基金立法

比利时的转机

作者：Lucas Wozny

Sovereign distressed debt investors can create holdout problems during sovereign restructurings. Scholars have suggested a wide-range of normative solutions to alleviate these holdout problems, including ad hoc deals, the creation of a multilateral international sovereign bankruptcy framework, the insertion of collective-action clauses into bonds, the expansion of judicial discretion, and the return of the doctrines of comity and sovereign immunity. However, national legislatures have increasingly begun to exhibit a preference for adopting national legislative solutions to this issue. In 2015, Belgium passed the broadest Anti-Vulture Funds Law to date, which is significant because the law impacts the Euroclear payment system. While this law has received high praise from the United Nations and from other nations also considering passing similar legislation, a careful analysis demonstrates it is not sensitive to the benefits that vulture funds bring, such as providing incentives to sovereigns to form more efficient capital structures, providing a moral hazard counterbalance, serving as liquidity providers on the secondary distressed-debt market, and providing information to the market. If adopted by other nations, Belgium’s law can eliminate the secondary distressed debt market by blocking liquidity-providers from the market. As a result, national legislatures should avoid using Belgium’s law as model law, but rather, enact legislation that enhances active settlement discussions without compromising the bargaining power or rights of either the sovereign or the vulture funds.

主权不良债务投资者可能会在主权重组期间产生抵制问题。学者们提出了广泛的规范性解决方案来缓解这些顽固的问题，包括特别交易、建立多边国际主权破产框架、将集体行动条款纳入债券、扩大司法自由裁量权以及礼让和主权豁免原则的回归。然而，国家立法机构越发倾向以国家立法来解决这个问题。2015年比利时通过了目前范围最广的反秃鹰基金法（Anti-Vulture Funds Law），这项法案非常重要，因为它影响了欧洲债券结算的支付系统。虽然本法案得到了联合国的高度认可、其他也在考虑通过类似立法的国家高度赞扬，但是一项详细的分析表明，它对于秃鹫基金所带来的好处并不敏感，比如激励主权国家架构更有效的资本结构，提供道德风险的平衡，在二级不良债务市场提供流动性以及向市场提供信息。如果其他国家通过该项法案，比利时的法律可利用阻止流动性提供者进入市场的方式来消除不良债务的二级市场。因此，国家立法机关应该避免将比利时的法律作为模板，而是制定立法，在不损害主权或者秃鹫基金的议价能力和权利的情况下，加强积极合谈。

原文链接：

https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/article/view/1722

（图片来源于网络）

The Price Isn't Right

Shareholder Proposals as Opportunities for Institutional Investors to Restore Firm Value and Reduce Pharmaceutical Prices

价格不对

股东提案作为机构投资者恢复公司价值和减少药品价格的机会

作者：Carly J. Goeman

Surging pharmaceutical prices in the United States create financial strain for patients, insurance companies, and state and federal governments. Regulatory delays and coverage denials due to product prices can also affect shareholders of pharmaceutical companies by depressing stock prices. While a number of industry leaders have acknowledged that dramatic price hikes can damage their businesses, many pharmaceutical companies have not demonstrated a willingness to scale back prices.

美国药品价格飙升给病人、保险公司以及州与联邦政府增加了财务上的压力。产品价格导致的监管延迟和覆盖范围的不足也会压低股票价格，影响制药公司的股东。虽然一些行业领导者知道价格的大幅上涨将会损害他们的业务，但许多制药公司仍不愿意降价。

This Note considers the use of shareholder proposals to address drug pricing policies at the company level. While shareholders of most companies are generally unable to address pricing policies, a carve-out created by the Securities and Exchange Commission allows shareholders of publicly traded pharmaceutical companies to do so. This Note studies how shareholders can use the carve-out to push for price restraint by either causing a company to include a price restraint proposal in its proxy materials and annual meeting or causing management to negotiate with proponent shareholders in order to convince the shareholders to withdraw their proposals. By evaluating the success of prior attempts to impact drug prices through shareholder proposals, this Note concludes that institutional investors are the linchpin of shareholder success, whether that success is through a vote at the annual meeting or a compromise at the negotiation table. This Note therefore calls on institutional investors to evaluate their portfolios and consider using shareholder proposals to unlock firm value and relieve the financial pressure created by rapidly rising drug prices.

本文考虑在公司层面适用股东提案来解决药品价格政策。虽然大多数公司的股东经常不能处理定价政策，但是美国证券交易委员会的例外条款允许上市交易药品公司的股东这样操作。本文研究了股东如何利用例外条款，使公司在其代理材料和年会材料中引入价格限制提案，或者促使管理层与提议股东进行谈判，说服股东撤回他们的提案。通过评估股东提案影响药品价格的成功经验，本文得出结论，即机构投资者是股东成功的关键，不管这种成功是通过年会上的投票还是谈判桌上的妥协。因此本文呼吁机构投资者评估他们的投资组合，并考虑利用股东提案来释放公司价值、减轻因药品快速涨价带来的财务危机。

原文链接：

https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/article/view/1723

（图片来源于网络）

The Crowdfund Act’s Impact on Women-Owned Businesses’ Access to Capital

众筹法对于女性企业获得资本的影响

作者：Elizabeth N. Brandt

Women-owned businesses make up a significant portion of businesses in the United States and provide one of the most important growth opportunities for the United States’ economy today. However, female entrepreneurs face on-going challenges in gaining access to capital through traditional capital-raising mechanisms such as venture capital or bank loans. The Obama administration heralded the CROWDFUND Act as a boon for women-owned businesses. Many believed that regulation crowdfunding, enabled through the Act, would democratize potential investors in small businesses, thereby increasing the number of investors willing to provide capital to female entrepreneurs and their businesses.

女性掌管的企业构成了美国企业的一个重要部分，为当今美国经济提供了重要的增长机会。但是女性企业在通过如风险投资或银行贷款获得资本这种传统的筹资机制方面面临越来越多的困难。奥巴马政府的众筹法案是女性企业的福音。许多人认为通过该法案实现的监管众筹可以使得小型企业中的潜在投资者民主化，进而提高愿意为女性企业家及其企业提供资金支持的投资者数量。

This Note provides the first quantified examination of the results of the first nearly eight months of regulation crowdfunding with respect to women-owned businesses. This Note additionally explores the results of regulation crowdfunding as reported by others. Ultimately, this Note determines that, at least in the first months of regulation crowdfunding, women-owned businesses did not take advantage of regulation crowdfunding in any meaningfully increased way compared to traditional capital-raising mechanisms. This Note proposes several ways in which the government could further support women-owned businesses, such as implementing a simple reporting mechanism to better track the capital-raising efforts of women-owned businesses and developing a pilot program of financial advisors available to founders and management of women-owned businesses seeking capital.

本文首次提供了女性企业近八个月的监管众筹结果的量化检查，进一步探讨了其他人所报告的监管众筹结果。最终，本文发现至少在监管众筹的前几个月内，相比于传统资本筹集机制，女性企业并没有在任何有意义的方面获得监管众筹的好处。本文提供了政府可以进一步支持女性企业的多种方式，如实施简单的报告机制，以更好地跟踪资本筹集工作、开发可供创始人使用的财务顾问试点项目以及寻求资本女性企业的管理试点项目。

原文链接：

https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/article/view/1724

（图片来源于网络）