法律翻译｜《法与经济学杂志》第59卷第4期

译者 | 张凯宸 中国政法大学

一审 | 赵逸之 北京大学

二审 | 汪晨涵 复旦大学

编辑 | 王冰子 烟台大学

         于   杰 上海对外经贸大学

责编 | 李   薇 浙江工商大学

The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 59, Number 4 | 2016

《法与经济学杂志》第59卷第4期

Unintended Consequences of Sanctions for Human Rights: Conflict Minerals 

and Infant Mortality

制裁侵犯人权行为的意外后果：冲突矿产[1]与婴儿死亡率

Dominic P. Parker, Jeremy D. Foltz, 

and David Elsea

Are victims of human rights abuses better off with or without economic sanctions targeted at their perpetrators? We study this question in the context of a US human rights policy, the conflict-minerals section of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. By discouraging companies from sourcing tin, tungsten, and tantalum from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the policy has acted as a de facto boycott on mineral purchases that may finance warlords and armed militias. We estimate the policy’s impact on the mortality of children born before 2013 and find that it increased the probability of infant deaths in villages near the policy-targeted mines by at least 143 percent. We find suggestive evidence that the legislation-induced boycott did so by reducing mothers’ consumption of infant health care goods and services.

对侵犯人权的实施者进行经济制裁，能否使受害者的处境改善呢？我们在美国2010年《多德—弗兰克法案》冲突矿产条款的人权政策背景下研究了这个问题。通过限制公司采购刚果民主共和国东部的锡、钨、钽等矿产，该政策对可能构成资助军阀和武装民兵的矿产采购活动形成了事实抵制。我们估计了该政策对2013年前出生儿童死亡率的影响，发现其使靠近目标矿山的村庄中的婴儿死亡率提升了至少143%。我们还发现有证据暗示，该法案引起的事实抵制减少了母亲对婴儿卫生保健产品和服务的消费，进而促使婴儿死亡率升高。

针对国内外企业的反串谋法[2]执行

Pierre Cremieux and Edward A. Snyder

Antitrust authorities must decide whether and how to consider the national identities of firms. Authorities may follow a neutral enforcement approach or focus on either foreign or domestic firms. We investigate these issues in the context of cartel enforcement against EU, US, and rest-of-the-world (ROW) firms by the European Union and the United States—the two jurisdictions with the longest and most robust enforcement histories. Our results suggest a mix of behaviors. The European Union is more likely to fine domestic and ROW firms than US firms, and the United States is no more likely to fine EU firms than domestic firms but disproportionately targets ROW firms. With respect to the size of fines, EU enforcement outcomes show no significant differences among categories of firms. The United States, however, levies significantly higher fines on foreign firms than domestic firms, whether from the European Union or the rest of the world.

反托拉斯机构必须决定是否以及如何考虑企业的国别身份。当局可能遵循中立的执法方式，也可能重点关注外国或国内企业。欧盟和美国这两个司法辖区拥有最为悠久、最强有力的执法历史。基于它们分别对欧盟、美国和世界其他地区的企业实施的卡特尔管制，我们研究了这些问题。我们的研究结果显示，欧盟比起美国企业，更倾向于对本土和世界其他地区企业进行罚款；美国在欧盟与本土企业间没有偏向性，但格外多地处罚世界其他地区企业。在罚款数额方面，欧盟的执法结果在不同类别企业间没有显著差异；但美国对于外国企业的罚款则显著高于国内企业，无论这些企业来自欧盟还是世界其他地区。

（图片来源于网络）

Hit Where It Hurts: Cartel Policing Using Targeted Sales and Supply Embargoes

直击要害：卡特尔通过针对性销售和供应禁运进行管控

Ajay Bhaskarabhatla, Chirantan Chatterjee, and Bas Karreman

In this paper, we examine an asymmetric-punishment strategy that a large and newly identified cartel of retailers uses to police its upstream suppliers and members. The cartel punishes suppliers who violate vertical restraints and members who defect in the key regional or product market where it hurts them the most. The cartel organizes sales embargoes to punish its suppliers and supply embargoes to punish its members. Cartels can leverage the targeted punishment strategy to induce good behavior across multiple product, regional, and vertical markets. We examine several episodes in which the association of retail pharmaceutical traders in India, acting as a cartel, imposes sales embargoes on select pharmaceutical firms and supply embargoes on its members, and we find evidence consistent with targeted punishment. Our results support the theoretical view that growing buyer power in conjunction with vertical restraints facilitates collusion.

本文研究了一个新认定的大型零售商卡特尔对其上游供应商和成员进行管控的不对称惩罚策略。该卡特尔惩罚两类主体：违反纵向限制的供应商和在关键区域或产品市场脱离卡特尔、致使集团损失惨重的成员。其通过销售禁运惩罚其供应商，通过供应禁运惩罚其成员。卡特尔可以借助有针对性的惩罚策略在多个产品、区域和垂直市场促进良好行为。我们研究了几起印度零售制药贸易商协会以卡特尔形态活动的事件，发现了有证据佐证针对性惩罚措施，即其对特定制药公司实施销售禁运，并对其成员实施供应禁运。我们的研究结果支持了这一理论观点，即买方力量的增强与纵向限制相结合有助于促成串谋。

Executive Lawyers: Gatekeepers or Strategic Officers?

Adair Morse, Wei Wang, and Serena Wu

Lawyers now serve as executives in 44 percent of corporations. Although endowed with gatekeeping responsibilities, executive lawyers face increasing pressure to spend time on strategic efforts. In a fixed-effects model, we quantify that lawyers are half as important as chief executive officers in explaining variances in compliance, monitoring, and business development. In a difference-in-differences model, we find that hiring lawyers as executives is associated with a 50 percent reduction in compliance breaches and a 32 percent reduction in monitoring breaches. We ask if optimal contracting of lawyers into strategic activities implies less gatekeeping effort. Comparing executive lawyers hired from law firms to lawyers poached from corporations, we find that lawyers hired with high compensation delta (indicative of the importance of strategic goals in compensation contracts) do less monitoring, which prevents 25 percent fewer breaches than are typically mitigated by having an executive gatekeeper. Reassuringly, lawyers do not compromise compliance.

律师目前在44%的公司中担任高管。尽管担负着把关职责，但是高管律师的压力越来越大，他们还需要在战略工作上投入精力。在一个固定效应模型中，我们的量化结果显示律师在解释合规、监管和业务发展的变化情况方面，其重要性是首席执行官（CEO）的一半。在一个双重差分模型中，我们发现聘请律师作为高管，可以使合规违规减少50%、监管违规减少32%。我们研究了与律师进行最优缔约、将其纳入公司战略活动是否意味着减少把关工作。比较从律所聘请的高管律师和从公司挖来的法律顾问，我们发现以高薪酬差（这表明薪酬合同中战略目标的重要性）聘请的律师做的监管工作更少，比高管守门人通常减少的违规少25%。令人安心的是，律师并不会在合规方面妥协。

（图片来源于网络）

The Short- and Long-Run Effects of Private Law Enforcement: Evidence from University Police

私人执法的短期与长期影响：

来自大学警察[3]的证据

Paul Heaton, Priscillia Hunt, John MacDonald, and Jessica Saunders

Over a million people in the United States are employed in private security and law enforcement, yet very little is known about the effects of private police on crime. The current study examines the relationship between a privately funded university police force and crime in a large US city. Following an expansion of the jurisdictional boundary of the private police force, we see no short-term change in crime. However, using a geographic regression discontinuity approach, we find large impacts of private police on public safety, with violent crime in particular decreasing. These contradictory results appear to be a consequence of a delayed effect of private police on crime.

在美国有超过一百万人从事私人安保和执法工作，然而我们对于私人警察对犯罪的影响所知甚少。本研究检验了在美国一座大城市，一支私人资助的大学警察队伍与当地犯罪活动之间的关系。我们发现在这支私人警察队伍辖区边界扩大后，犯罪没有任何短期变化。但是，采用地理断点回归方法，我们发现私人警察对公共安全的影响重大，尤以暴力犯罪的减少最为突出。这些矛盾的结果似乎是由私人警察对犯罪产生影响的延迟效应导致的。

Market Responses to Court Rulings: Evidence from Antiquities Auctions

市场对于法庭裁决的回应:

来自古董拍卖的证据

Silvia Beltrametti and James V. Marrone

Although a vast literature considers whether the enactment of laws and regulations impacts markets, very little attention has been paid to the ability of courts to have such an effect. This paper fills this gap by providing evidence that court decisions can bring to bear existing legal standards and can have significant effects on market behavior, especially if they convey credible commitments to enforce sanctions. This study shows that the outcome of certain court decisions can reduce illicit trade. By analyzing novel disaggregated data of antiquities sold at auction in the past 20 years, our results indicate that, following punitive court rulings, the share of legitimate items (measured by their ownership history, or provenance) and the price premium paid for such items both increased. In addition, we show that standard assumptions behind repeat-sales indices fail to hold as buyers’ tastes change.

尽管大量文献研究了法律和法规的制定是否会影响市场，学界对法庭的这种影响能力关注甚少。本文提供证据填补了这一研究空白，证明了法庭裁判可以促进现行法律标准的实施，并对市场行为产生显著影响，特别是如果它们能做出执行制裁的可靠承诺。本研究显示，某些法庭裁判的结果可以减少非法交易。通过分析过去20年古董拍卖的全新分类数据，我们的研究结果表明，惩罚性的法庭裁决提升了合法物品（以其所有权历史或来源衡量）的份额和为这些物品支付的溢价。此外，我们还发现重复交易指数的标准假设在买方喜好变化时不成立。

[1] 冲突矿产，是产在刚果民主共和国东部极端暴力地区、在武装冲突和侵犯人权情况下所开采的钨、锡、钽和黄金(3TG)及其衍生矿物,以及由国务卿决定的任何其他矿物或其衍生物。目前涉及的冲突矿产来源区域主要为刚果(金)及其周边9个国家。见李丽、董昕烨：《全球矿业治理的现实困境与中国的未来选择》，载《国际经济评论》2019年第5期。

[2]反串谋法（anticollusion law），即反卡特尔法、卡特尔管制法。串谋，指企业为限制、排除竞争而达成垄断协议的行为。

[3]大学警察，又称校园警察，是是美国、加拿大等国的一种警察，通常是学院或大学聘用的警察，用以保护校园和周边地区的私人财产、生活、工作和参观者的安全。见：Campus Police – Wikipedia, Wikipedia (Feb. 24th, 2024), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Campus_police。

https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/jle/2016/59/4