法律翻译｜《法与经济学杂志》第61卷第2期

译者｜靳益群 中南财经政法大学本科

一审｜L Y J   NUS LL.M.

二审｜郝林桦 西南政法大学本科

编辑｜许素敏 广州美术学院本科

         余卓妍 西安交通大学本科

责编｜李   薇 浙江工商大学本科

The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 61, Number 2 | 2018

《法与经济学杂志》第61卷第2期

Race, Gender, and Juries: 

Evidence from North Carolina

种族、性别与陪审团：

以北卡罗来纳州实据为佐证

Francis X. Flanagan

This paper uses data from felony jury trials in North Carolina to show that the race and gender composition of the randomly selected jury pool has a significant effect on the probability of conviction, attorneys adjust peremptory-challenge strategies in accordance, and state peremptory challenges have a positive impact on the conviction rate when the defendant is a black male. Jury pools with higher proportions of white men are more likely to convict black male defendants relative to white male defendants. Jury pools with a higher proportion of black men are more likely to acquit all defendants, especially black men. Attorneys use peremptory challenges strategically in accordance with these results, which are robust to a wide set of controls, including county and judge fixed effects. Each state peremptory challenge is correlated with a 2.4–2.9-percentage-point increase in the conviction rate when the defendant is black.

本文选用来自北卡罗来纳州重罪陪审团审判的数据借以表明：随机抽取的陪审团成员的种族和性别构成对定罪概率有显著影响。与之相配，律师会相应调整无因回避策略；当被告为黑人男性时，州内无因回避对定罪率所产生的正向影响体现尤甚。相较于白人男性为被告的情形，由较高比例白人男性组成的陪审团更容易将黑人男性被告定罪。而由较高比例黑人男性组成的陪审团更倾向于宣告所有被告无罪，这种情况在被告为黑人男性时更为明显。律师根据上述结果策略性地使用无因回避(peremptory challenges)，这些结果也稳定体现在包括县固定效应和法官固定效应在内的一系列控制因素的适用层面。当被告是黑人时，每个州的无因回避与定罪率上涨约2.4-2.9 个百分点。

（图片源于网络）

Vertical Most-Favored-Nation Restraints and Credit Card No-Surcharge Rules

纵向最惠国限制和信用卡无附加费规则

Dennis W. Carlton and Ralph A. Winter

A vertical most-favored-nation (vMFN) restraint prohibits a retailer from charging more for one supplier’s product than for rivals’ products. For credit card services, this restraint takes the form of a no-surcharge rule: the credit card company prohibits the retailer from surcharging transactions using the company’s card. This article develops a theory of vMFN restraints and applies it to credit cards. The vMFN clause harms competition among upstream suppliers, which raises price to a level even greater than the monopoly price. The vMFN clause can also be used to extract surplus from customers of products supplied competitively. Applying the theory to credit card antitrust cases, we find that the two-sided nature of the market does not mandate a new set of competition policy principles, contrary to the decision in Ohio v. American Express. Indeed, the economic literature on credit card networks as two-sided platforms rediscovers established principles of price theory.

纵向最惠国（vMFN）限制禁止零售商对任意一家供应商产品收取高于竞争对手产品的价格。

就信用卡服务而言，此种限制采取无附加费规则形式，即：信用卡公司禁止零售商对经由使用该公司信用卡的交易额外收取附加费。本文提出了 vMFN 限制理论，并将其应用于信用卡领域。vMFN 条款会损害上游供应商之间的竞争，从而将价格抬升至高于垄断价格的位置。vMFN 条款还可用于从具有竞争力的产品客户处获取盈余。在适用该理论的信用卡反垄断案件中，本文发现市场的双边性并不要求制定一套新的竞争政策原则，然而此结论与俄亥俄州诉美国运通案（Ohio v. American Express）的判决相悖。事实上，有关信用卡网络作为双边平台的经济学文献重新界定了价格理论的既定原则。

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Plague, Politics, and Pogroms: 

The Black Death, the Rule of Law, and the Persecution of Jews in the Holy Roman Empire

瘟疫、政治和大屠杀： 神圣罗马帝国的黑死病、法治和对犹太人的迫害

Theresa Finley and Mark Koyama

This paper explores the institutional determinants of persecution by studying the intensity of the Black Death pogroms in the Holy Roman Empire. We provide evidence that communities governed by archbishoprics, bishoprics, and imperial free cities experienced more intense and violent persecutions than did those governed by the emperor. We suggest that political fragmentation exacerbated competition for the rents generated by Jewish moneylending, which made Jews more vulnerable during periods of crisis.

本文旨在通过对神圣罗马帝国黑死病大屠杀的野蛮强度和规模进行研习，来探讨迫害制度的决定因素。透过所供证据可知，受大主教区、主教区和帝国自由城管辖的社区，相较于由皇帝所统治的辖区，历经了更为激烈和残暴的迫害。我们认为，政治分裂加剧了对犹太人因放贷而产生的租金的争夺，使其在危机时期更加脆弱。

（图片源于网络）

Health Insurance Expansions and Providers’ Behavior: 

Evidence from Substance-Use- Disorder Treatment Providers

医疗保险规模扩张与服务提供行为之间的关系：来自药物使用障碍治疗机构的证据

Johanna Catherine Maclean, Ioana Popovici, and Elisheva R. Stern

We examine how substance-use-disorder (SUD) treatment providers respond to private-insurance expansions induced by states’ equal coverage (parity) laws for SUD treatment vis-à-vis general health care services. Economic theory suggests that such laws will lead to changes in providers’ behaviors. We use data on licensed specialty SUD treatment providers in the United States between 1997 and 2010 in a differences-in-differences analysis. During this period, 12 states implemented laws that require equality in coverage for SUD treatment. Following the passage of a state parity law, we find that providers are less likely to participate in public markets, are less likely to offer price discounts to patients, and increase the quantity of health care provided. Further, we find evidence of decreases in treatment intensity following passage of a parity law and of heterogeneity in effects across ownership status.

本文研究药物滥用障碍（SUD）治疗提供者如何应对各州针对药物滥用障碍治疗与普通医疗服务的平等保险（同等）法律所引发的私人保险扩张。经济理论认为，此类法律的推行将导致医疗服务提供者的行为发生变化。我们在双重差分法分析中使用了 1997 年至 2010 年美国获得许可的专科药物滥用治疗提供者的数据。在此期间，12个州施行了对药物依赖性精神疾病治疗实行采取平等保险要求的法律。本文发现，州同等法的通过使得医疗服务提供者参与公共市场的可能性降低，减小了向患者提供价格折扣、增加提供医疗保健数量的可能性。此外，本文发现相关证据表明，在同等法通过后，医疗保障强度会有所下降，而且不同所有制状况下所展示出的具体实效也不尽相同。

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The People’s Perspective on Libertarian-Paternalistic Policies

透过人民的角度审视自由主义-家长制政策

Ayala Arad and Ariel Rubinstein

We examine the views toward libertarian-paternalistic (soft) governmental interventions in a series of online experiments conducted in three countries. We use both standard and new methods to elicit attitudes toward soft interventions in various hypothetical scenarios. The majority of the participants accept these types of interventions by the government. However, a substantial proportion opposes them and would prefer that the government simply provide information to help the public make the right choice rather than use a more effective choice architecture intervention. Some even refuse to make the choice that the government promotes, although they would have done so in the absence of the intervention. The opposition to soft interventions appears to be driven by concerns about manipulation and the fear of a slippery slope to nonconsensual interventions. Opposition to soft interventions is reduced when they are implemented by employers rather than the government.

本文在三个国家推进了一系列的线上实验，通过采用标准和新型方法并举、依托各种虚设情境激发人们对软干预措施的态度，来考察民众对于自由主义-家长式（软性）政府干预的看法。绝大多数的参与者对这类政府干预措施呈接受态度。然而，参与者中也存在相当一部分人表示反对，他们更希望政府仅仅只是提供信息帮助公众作出正确的选择，而不是推行有效的选择架构干预理论。有些参与者甚至拒绝做出政府所提倡的选择，尽管在没有干预的情况下他们也本会选择这样做。反对软干预似乎是出于对操纵的担忧和对非自愿干预滑坡的恐惧。如果软干预由雇主而非政府实施时，那么对软干预的反对就会减少。

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Property Rights Restrictions 

and Housing Prices

产权限制与房价

Kwan Ok Lee and Joseph T.L. Ooi

Using a natural experiment in Singapore, we examine the economic impact of temporarily restricting owners’ rights to transfer their property.  Executive condominiums (ECs), introduced to provide affordable housing for middle-class citizens, are subject to restrictions on transferability in the first 10 years, unlike private condominiums (PCs). As per the option theory, EC buyers have the forward-start American put option with the right to sell their properties only after the contract date. Among transacted units matched by location, completion and transaction dates, and complex- and unit-level characteristics, we find that prices of new ECs are about 21 percent lower than those of PCs. After the 10th year, when property rights restrictions are completely removed, the price gap between ECs and PCs narrows to about 3 percent. These results suggest that property rights restrictions and illiquidity generated by the forward-start American put option for 10 years results in an 18 percent discount.

本文借助发生在新加坡的一个自然实验，来研究暂时限制业主转让房产权利随之而来的经济影响。异于私人公寓（PC），行政公寓（EC）是专为中产阶级市民量身打造的经济适用房，但其前十年的转让权受限。根据期权理论，EC买方拥有美式看跌期权的远期起始权，同时只有在合同日期之后才有权出售其房产。根据地点、竣工和交易日期以及建筑群和单元特征来将成交单元进行匹配，我们发现新EC的价格比PC低约 21%。到了第 10 年，即当产权限制完全取消时，EC与PC之间的价格差距则缩小到约 3%。这些结果表明，10年期远期启动的美式看跌期权所产生的产权限制和流动性不足导致了18%的减价。

（图片源于网络）