法律翻译 | 《法与经济学杂志》第65卷S1号

译者 | 刘美彤 范德堡大学LL.M.

审稿 | 董   辰 中国政法大学硕士

         张亦衡 南加州大学本科

编辑 | 李   薇 浙江工商大学本科

         李建云 中国政法大学硕士

责编 | 李   薇 浙江工商大学本科

The Journal of Law and Economics (run by Chicago faculty) Volume 65, Number S1|February 2022,

P. 1-325 Abstract

《法与经济学杂志》第65卷S1号

2022年2月

第1-325页摘要部分

Property Rights to Land

 and Agricultural Organization: 

An Argentina–United States Comparison

土地及农业组织的所有权：

以阿根廷与美国为对比

作者：Eric C. Edwards, Martin Fiszbein, 

and Gary D. Libecap

The contributions of Harold Demsetz offer key insights on how property rights and transaction costs shape economic organization. These guide our comparison of agricultural organization in the early 20th century in two comparable regions, the Argentine Pampas and the US Midwest. In the United States, land was distributed in small parcels and actively traded. In the Pampas, land was distributed in large plots, and trade was limited because land was a social and political asset, as well as a commercial one. We analyze why the absence of trade led to persistently larger farms, specialization in ranching, and peculiar tenancy contracts in Argentina relative to the United States. Our empirical analysis, based on county-level data for both regions, shows that geoclimatic factors cannot explain the observed differences in agricultural organization. We discuss implications for long-term economic development in Argentina.

哈罗德 德姆塞茨（Harold Demsetz） 为研究所有关财产权与交易成本如何改变了经济结构作出了关键贡献。以他的观点为指导，我们对比了二十世纪早期阿根廷潘帕斯草原与美国中西部的农业组织。在美国中西部，土地被分配为小块并被频繁交易。在潘帕斯草原，土地被分配为大块但被限制交易，因为土地是兼具社会性，政治性与商业性的资产。我们分析了为什么交易的缺失会导致农场的持续性扩大，牧场经营的专业化，以及相对于美国，阿根廷更具特殊的租赁合同。我们基于两地县级的数据进行了实证分析，分析结果表明地理气候因素并不能解释所观察到的农业组织的不同点。我们讨论了对阿根廷长期的经济发展的影响。

Property Rights and Urban Form

产权与城市形态

作者：Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, 

Valeria Perotti, and Andrei Shleifer

How do the different elements in the standard bundle of property rights, including those of possession and transfer, influence the shape of cities? This paper incorporates insecure property rights into a standard model of urban land prices and density and makes predictions about investment in land and property, informality, and the efficiency of land use. Our empirical analysis links data on institutions for land titling and transfer with multiple urban outcomes in 190 countries. The evidence is generally consistent with the model’s predictions and more broadly with Harold Demsetz’s approach to property rights institutions in “Towards a Theory of Property Rights.” Indeed, we document worldwide improvements in the quality of institutions facilitating property transfer over time.

标准产权组合，包括占有与转让的不同要素，是如何影响城市的形态的？本篇文章将小产权纳入城市土地价格与密度的标准模型，并且对于土地及产权的投资，城市的非正规性，及土地使用的有效性做了预测。我们的实证分析将190个国家的土地所有权及转让制度的数据及多种城市进程成果联系起来。证据与模型的预测基本上一致，并且与哈罗德·德姆塞茨（Harold Demsetz）在《走向产权理论》中对于产权制度的研究更为一致。实际上，我们记录了全球范围内关于促进产权转让制度随着时间发展更完善的现象。

（图片来源于网络）

The Tragedy of “The Tragedy of the Commons”: Hardin versus the Property Rights Theorists

《公地悲剧》之悲剧

作者：Jonathan M. Karpoff

Garrett Hardin’s article “The Tragedy of the Commons” is widely influential but fundamentally incorrect. Hardin characterizes the commons problem as arising from the exercise of free will in a world with limited carrying capacity. Hardin’s solutions to this problem emphasize coercive policies, including traditional command-and-control environmental and natural resource regulations. In contrast, the property rights literature that preceded Hardin shows that the commons problem arises from nonexclusive-use rights. Non-exclusivity is part of a broader class of restrictions on private ownership, any of which fosters dissipative rent seeking. The property rights literature focuses on value creation rather than just the physical exhaustion of the commonly owned resource. It is therefore more general and highlights solutions that are less coercive and dissipative than the more widely known views espoused by Hardin.

加勒特·哈丁（Garrett Hardin）的文章《公地悲剧》影响深远，却在基础上是错误的。哈丁（Hardin）认为公地问题产生于一个只有有限环境承载力的世界，人们在其中实践自己的自由意志。对于公地问题的解决方法，他强调强制性政策，包括传统的命令与控制环境以及自然资源法规。与之相反，在哈丁之前写就的产权文章表明了公地问题来源于不专有的使用权。使用权不专有是限制私有权利的一种方式，并且任限制似有权利的行为都会助长损耗性的寻租活动。该产权文章着眼于价值的创造，而非仅仅关注公有资源的物理性损耗。因此尽管哈丁的观点更为广为人知，但前述所提文章的解决方案比哈丁的更有普适性，且强制性和资源消耗性也次之。

The Economics of Radiator Springs: Dynamics, Sunk Costs, and Spatial Demand Shifts

散热器弹簧中的经济学：动力学，沉没成本，

以及空间需求变化

作者：Jeffrey R. Campbell

 and Thomas N. Hubbard

Harold Demsetz famously emphasized that the relationship between industry structure and competition runs in both directions. Competition thus can lead industries to adjust to demand increases through larger firms rather than more firms. We investigate this insight empirically by examining how local gasoline retail markets adjusted to interstate highway openings. We find that when a new highway was close to a previous route, average producer size increased beginning 1 year before it opened. If instead the interstate substantially displaced traffic, the number of producers increased beginning only after it opened. These results empirically illustrate how the role of entry in the competitive process depends on whether entry makes product space more crowded.

哈罗德·德姆塞茨（Harold Demsetz）曾强调过行业结构与竞争的关系是双向的。因此，竞争可以让行业在适应需求增长时，选择扩大公司规模，而非增加公司数量。我们用实证的方法探究这一观点，调查当地汽油零售企业如何适应州际高速的开通。我们发现当新高速的路径与此前的路径相近时，生产商的平均规模在高速开设一年前就会扩大。如果州际高速公路代替了此前的交通途径，则只有在高速开设之后，生产商的数量才会增加。前述结果在实证上表明了新商家进入市场在竞争过程中的角色取决于该进入现象是否让产品空间更拥挤。

Productivity, Prices, and Concentration in Manufacturing: 

A Demsetzian Perspective

生产力，价格，以及制造业的集中度：

德姆塞茨的观点

作者：Sam Peltzman

Concentration and price-cost margins have increased since the 1980s in many industries. These developments have raised concern about weakened competition and resulting harm to consumers and the need for tougher antitrust enforcement. In 1973 Harold Demsetz cautioned against inferring weakened competition from high or rising margins and concentration. He argued that this correlation between margins and concentration could arise from productivity differences across competitive firms. This paper studies the interplay between concentration, prices, and productivity across US manufacturing industries over two 15-year periods from 1982 to 2012. The consistent pattern is that high and rising concentration has been associated with better productivity growth. I show that widening margins, whether related to concentration or not, are mainly driven by productivity gains rather than prices, as in the competitive process outlined by Demsetz. Skepticism about tougher antitrust policy may be warranted: this would risk harm to productivity without benefiting consumers.

自从1980年代开始，集中度以及利润率在很多行业都开始提升。这些发展让人们开始担心市场竞争被削弱，消费者受损，并且开始要求更强有力的反垄断法的执行手段。1973年，哈罗德 德姆塞茨（Harold Demsetz）告诫道，不能仅从高或者正在上升的利润率和集中度来推断竞争会被削弱。他认为，利润率和集中度之间的相关性可能是源于有竞争关系的企业之间的不同生产力。这篇文章研究了美国制造行业跨越了两个十五年，从1982年到2012年间，集中度，价格，以及生产力的相互关系。一致的模式为高且增长的集中度，总是伴随着更多的生产力增长。本文表明，利润率的扩大，无论是否与集中度有关，都仅由生产力提高而驱动，而非价格驱动。这和德姆塞斯（Demsetz）在竞争过程中所描述的一致。基于这些研究结果，对于采用更强硬的反垄断政策的批判观点可能应该被支持：更强硬的反垄断政策可能在无法使消费者受益的同时减损生产力。

（图片来源于网络）

Price Benchmark Regulation of Multiproduct Firms: 

An Application to the Rail Industry

多产品公司的价格基准法规：

于铁路行业的应用

作者：Wesley W. Wilson 

and Frank A. Wolak

Building on Harold Demsetz’s argument that market forces can be more effective in disciplining the pricing behavior of firms relative to explicit output price regulation, this paper proposes and analyzes the performance of a price benchmark approach to identify unreasonable prices in multiproduct industries subject to residual reasonable price regulation. An empirical application to the freight rail sector demonstrates that this mechanism has the potential to provide economically meaningful relief to shippers at lower cost, with less administrative burden, and without significant adverse financial consequences for the railroads.

基于哈罗德·德姆塞茨（Harold Demsetz）的观点，即与明确的规定商品产出价格相比，市场力量能更有效的规制公司的定价行为，本文提出并且分析了价格基准方法在受剩余合理价格规制下，识别多产品行业不合理价格的表现。对于货运铁路部门的实证性应用表明了这种机制有潜力为承运者减少经济压力，使成本更低，行政负担更少，并且对于铁路本身也没有明显不良经济后果。

The Effects of Government Licensing on E-commerce: Evidence from Alibaba

政府许可对于电子商务的影响：

以阿里巴巴为实证

作者：Ginger Zhe Jin, Zhentong Lu, 

Xiaolu Zhou, and Chunxiao Li

Inspired by the call in Demsetz’s “Barriers to Entry” for assessing the implications of occupational licensing, we examine how the 2015 Food Safety Law (FSL) affects e-commerce in China. The FSL requires most food sellers on e-commerce platforms to obtain off-line licenses. On the basis of its gradual rollout on Alibaba, we find that larger and more-reputable sellers display an FSL license earlier, and buyers are more willing to transact with a licensed seller, especially if the seller is younger and unestablished. This suggests that the license is informative. Market-wide, the average quality of surviving sellers has improved and seller concentration has increased since the FSL. The platform’s gross merchandise value for food did not decline, nor did the average sales price increase 1 year into full enforcement. This suggests that the FSL does not hamper long-term market performance, probably because it enhances seller quality and market transparency.

受到德姆塞斯（Demsetz）于“进入壁垒”中对于评估职业许可带来影响的呼吁，我们研究了2015年出台的食品安全法（FSL）如何影响中国的电子商务。FSL要求绝大多数电子商务平台上的食品贩卖商取得线下证照。在该规定于阿里巴巴逐步推进的基础上，我们发现规模，名声更大的食品销售商会更早的展示其FSL证照，买方也更倾向于与有证照的销售商进行交易，尤其当销售商资历尚浅之时。这表明了证照向消费者提供了所需信息。在整个市场上，自FSL出台后，现存销售商的平均质量获得了提升，经营者也更为集中。在FSL全面实施一年间，阿里巴巴平台上的总商品净价值并未减少，并且平均售价也未增加。这表明FSL的出台并没有阻碍市场长期的表现，大概率是因为这部法律提升了销售者的质量以及促进了市场的透明化。

（图片来源于网络）

Learning by Regulating: The Evolution of Wind Energy Zoning Laws

在法规中学习：风能区划法的演变

作者：Justin B. Winikoff

I study the determinants of regulation in an emerging industry by analyzing the uptake and evolution of local wind energy zoning laws. I do so by assembling a novel database of county wind energy conversion system ordinances. Using a duration analysis, I find that counties adopt regulations when potential benefits from doing so are high and regulatory costs are low. Although counties mimic the standards of their neighbors, regulations eventually become spatially heterogeneous, presumably as governments better align policies with local preferences. The findings highlight the dynamic nature of regulation in a formal environment, building on the seminal study of property rights by Harold Demsetz. I also contribute to an ongoing policy debate about which levels of government can effectively regulate wind power. I find that current state proposals to reclaim centralized control will likely stunt the local adaptation observed unless the counties have insufficient regulatory capacity to create regulations.

我通过分析当地风能区划法的演变，研究在一个新兴行业的监管制度的决定性因素。为了研究前述法律演变，我搭建了一个新的有关于郡级风力转换系统的条例数据库。通过久期分析法，我发现郡级政府倾向于在潜在收益高，且适用法规成本小的情况下会采用相关法规。虽然郡级政府会模仿其周边政府的标准，但是各地法规最终呈现出空间异质性，大概是因为政府倾向于使政策与本地倾向相一致。这些发现建立在哈罗德·德姆塞茨（Harold Demsetz）对于产权开创性的学术研究的基础上，强调了在正常环境中监管法规的动态性。关于正在进行的关于哪一级别的政府可以有效监管风能的政策辩论，本文也提供了相关见解。我发现除非各郡没有足够的管理能力来制定法规，否则当前各州所提出的国家恢复集中管控的提议，很大可能会阻碍当前我们所观察到的各郡对法规的适用情况。

Organizations with Power-Hungry Agents

组织与渴求权利的代理人

作者：Wouter Dessein 

and Richard Holden

We analyze a model of hierarchies in organizations in which neither decisions nor the delegation of decisions is contractible and in which power-hungry agents derive a private benefit from making decisions. Two distinct agency problems arise and interact: subordinates make more biased decisions (which favors adding more hierarchical layers), but uninformed superiors may fail to delegate (which favors removing layers). A designer may remove intermediate layers of the hierarchy (eliminate middle managers) or flatten an organization by removing top layers (eliminate top managers). We show that stronger preferences for power result in smaller, less-integrated hierarchies. Our key insight is that hoarding of decision rights is especially severe at the top of the hierarchy.

我们分析了一种在组织内部的等级结构的模型，在其中无论是决策，还是决策的授权都是不可协商的，并且渴求权利的代理人在做决策时谋求私利。两个不同的代理问题就此出现并且相互影响：下属会做出更多含有偏向的决定（支持增加更多等级层次），但是不知情的上司可能无法成功授权（支持减少等级层次）。设计者可以移除等级制度的中间层（减少中层管理者），或者通过移除顶层层级的方式来使组织结构扁平化（减少上层管理者）。我们发现对于权力更强烈的渴望会导致更小，更分散的等级结构。我们关键的观点为决策权的囤积现象在等级制度中的高层尤为严重。

Collectivist Cultures 

and the Emergence of Family Firms

集体主义文化与家族企业的出现

作者：Joseph P. H. Fan, 

Qiankun Gu, and Xin Yu

Using a sample of 1,103 Chinese private-sector firms that went public during 2004–16, we find that founders of firms from regions with stronger collectivist cultures engage more family members as managers, retain more ownership in the family, and share the controlling ownership with more family members. These findings are robust to a battery of diagnostic tests to account for alternative institutional factors that may induce the relationships. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that because the collectivist culture reduces information asymmetry, shirking problems, and associated monitoring costs among family members, more family ownership and management are expected in firms when founders are from collectivist regions. The overall evidence supports the theory of the firm pioneered by Harold Demsetz and his coauthors.